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 STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
MALAYSIAN LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to identify stakeholder perceptions on the service performance 
accountability of Malaysian local authorities. 
Design/methodology/approach – A questionnaire survey provides the primary source of 
information, and both descriptive and analytical methods are employed to support the analysis 
of the empirical findings. 
Findings – The paper shows that despite a strong interest amongst stakeholders for greater 
accountability of Malaysian local authorities, a standard definition and scope of accountability 
has not emerged. However, the findings do indicate a new bond of accountability emerging 
between local authorities and its broader public than previously existed. 
Research limitations – The findings and discussion are limited to the propositions put 
forward in the questionnaire. Alternative research methods would complement the findings. 
Originality/value – The findings contribute to our understanding of accountability as 
interpreted by key stakeholders of local authorities located within the context of a developing 
country. This could potentially assist Malaysian public sector administrators whereby, and 
arguably, enhancing the public accountability of local authorities may contribute to an 
improvement in the performance management of Malaysian local authorities. 
Keywords – Local authority, Malaysia, Performance accountability. 
Paper type – Research paper 
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STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF MALAYSIAN 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Internationally, the public sector has been subjected to criticism for, amongst other perceived 
ailments, inefficiency, poor performance and ineffective accountability. In response, 
governments of both developed and developing countries have, since the early 1980s, sought 
to address such deficiencies through administrative reform and reorganisation. Although 
aspects of the reform agenda have varied amongst individual countries, it is widely 
acknowledged that the broad thrust of the public management reforms is framed within what 
is referred to as the new public management (NPM) (for example, Guthrie, Olson and 
Humphrey, 1999; Lapsley, 1999). Although several doctrines underpin the NPM (see, Hood, 
1991; 1995), of particular relevance to this paper is the call for improved public 
accountability of governments (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Mulgan and Uhr, 2000) and for 
public sector managers to be held accountable for both their managerial performance and 
financial management of entrusted resources (Parker and Guthrie 1993; Hood, 1995). 
Improving the accountability of the public sector, it is argued, will encourage a more efficient 
and effective public administration. 
 
In common with other Southeast Asian countries, the Malaysian public sector has undergone 
NPM-type transformation with the aim of inducing a more efficient, energised and market-
driven administration (Cheung and Scott, 2003; Siddiquee, 2006; Swee and Kevasapany, 
2006). Notably, and in recent times, there has been increased public interest in the 
performance of Malaysian local authorities in the delivery of public services. This has brought 
about change in the relationship between the Malaysian public and local authorities from one 
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of passive service recipient and/or fund provider (i.e. tax/ratepayer) to active demands for 
local authorities to have greater transparency and improved accountability for performance 
(Anonymous, The Sun, August 30, 2005; The Star, March 4, 2005; Berita Harian, October 3, 
2005).  It has been reported that State Governments are also expressing dissatisfaction with 
local authority performance but, perhaps, for different reasons than those advanced by other 
stakeholders. As ‘creations’ of State Governments and with direct statutory answerability to 
their respective State Government (Sections 9 and 53 of Malaysian Local Government Act 
1976 [Act 171]) there is a political concern that the lines of responsibility for the activities 
and achievements of local authorities may become blurred and inefficiencies and poor 
performance may come to reflect poorly on the State Government and affect its political 
popularity (Anonymous, News Straits Times, July, 2003; The Sun, Feb, 17. 2006). 
 
Although the conceptual importance of accountability and ‘being held accountable for results’ 
are recognized as key elements of the NPM, it is generally recognised that accountability is a 
complex concept and a standardised meaning remains elusive (Bovens et al., 2005; Budding, 
2004; Goddard, 2005; Mulgan, 2000: Mulgan and Uhr, 2000). Sinclair (1995, p.221) argues 
that accountability is a nebulous concept lacking a clear definition, dependent on the 
“ideologies, motifs and language” of the time and with “discipline-specific meanings” and, 
therefore, “the more definitive we attempt to render the concept the more murky it becomes”. 
Therefore, there is an opportunity for developing further understanding about the way in 
which accountability is defined and applied within specific contexts. This paper seeks to 
further explore the concept of accountability, within the context of one sector of the 
Malaysian public sector (i.e. local authority), from a stakeholder perspective. Three core 
issues underpin the study: whether a Malaysian local authority should be accountable for its 
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performance and if so, why; key stakeholders’ understanding of the scope of accountability 
and to whom a local authority should be accountable?  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical 
framework that underpins this study. Section 3 outlines the administrative and accountability 
structures that currently exist within the Malaysian local authority sector. Section 4 outlines 
the research method used to gather the empirical data, while section 5 reports the findings. 
The findings are analysed and discussed in section 6 and the paper concludes with the 
customary summary, limitations of the study and a suggestion for further research. 
 
2.0 Theoretical Framework  
In its broadest sense, accountability simply refers to the giving and demanding of reasons for 
conduct in which people are required to explain and take responsibility for their actions 
(Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Day and Klien, 1987; Romzek and Dubrick, 1998; Pollitt, 2003; 
Bovens, 2005). In a more specific sense, accountability has been variously defined as 
implying a literal accounting/reporting function or an explanation or justification of actions 
taken (Patton, 1992). It is generally recognised that accountability involves two core 
components – a call to account and a giving of the account (Gray and Jenkins, 1993; Goddard, 
2005). These components complement each other and demonstrate the capacity to perform 
actions in a responsible manner and to transparently communicate to stakeholders what has 
been done (Farneti and Bestebreur, 2004). Accountability is also seen to encompass the right 
of the accountee to pass judgement and, if warranted, impose formal or informal sanctions 
(Mulgan, 2000; Keohane, 2002; Bovens, 2005).  
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The institutionalised practice of accountability is underpinned by two taxonomical issues 
which, in turn, may give rise to multiple accountabilities: the accountability relationship and 
the scope of accountability.  At its core, accountability is about a relationship; a relationship 
between the accountor and the accountee. The accountor and accountee can be either an 
individual or an agency, or in the case of an accountee can also be a virtual collective such as 
the ‘general public’. The relationship between who has the obligation to account and who has 
the legitimacy to hold to account has been described by Gray and Jenkins (1993) as one of 
stewardship where the accountor accepts resources and responsibilities entrusted by an 
accountee, and in return is obliged to present and answer to an account as to the execution of 
the stewardship. Such an obligation can be formal or informal and underpinned by a legal or 
moral/ethical responsibility. 
 
Relational classifications of accountability have focused on who the accountee is and are 
commonly defined in the context of public accountability, political accountability, legal 
accountability, administrative accountability and professional accountability (see for example, 
Sinclair, 1995; Behn, 2001; Pollitt, 2003). Other classifications are promoted on the basis of 
who the accountee is holding to account and include corporate accountability, hierarchical 
accountability, professional accountability, collective accountability and individual 
accountability (for example, Bovens, 1989; Romzek, 2000; Romzek and Johnston, 2005). 
Although presented as discrete and distinguishable forms of accountability relationships, 
accountees typically operate in a dynamic accountability environment with a myriad of 
accountability relationships and where each relationship imposes competing demands as to 
the form of the account.  
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Underpinning each accountability relationship is an established order or custom which 
governs behaviour. Gray and Jenkins (1993, p.55) refer to this as ‘codes of accountability’ 
defined as “a system of signals, meanings and customs which binds the principal and steward 
in the establishment, execution and adjudication of their relationship.” While they may be 
distinguished and characterised in a number of ways it is the manner in which codes of 
accountability embody different, but not necessarily competing, rationalities that is 
significant. The term ‘rationalities’, refers to the interpretative frames that define each 
accountor’s scope of accountability and the methods by which this will be realised. That is, 
different accountees may have different expectations, based on different norms, of accountee 
performance and conduct and therefore may require different data sets upon which to pass 
different judgements (Bovens, 2005). Various concepts of the scope of accountability have 
been stated often based on five rationalities identified by Diesing (1962): legal, economic, 
technical, social and political. Legal rationality sets out the fundamental rules that are used by 
societies in promoting order, assigning responsibility, regulating difference, and containing 
conflict. Economic rationality specifies the economic calculus by which alternative ends 
and/or means are compared and is clearly related to technical rationality that outlines the 
expert/knowledge-based criteria by which means are selected in relation to ends. Social 
rationality sets out conditions which have to be met if social integration is to be maintained 
and, in turn, is related to political rationality that stipulates the pragmatic requirements for 
sustaining the integration of decision-making structures and processes (Degeling, Anderson 
and Guthrie, 1996).  
 
While some codes of accountability may appear to draw on or promote one of the five 
rationalities above another, in practice they comprise combinations and in doing so produce 
their own definitions of the scope of accountability, the objectives and conduct of its 
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execution, and the terms in which the account is presented and adjudicated. From a 
combination of the rationalities identified by Diesing (1962), Gray and Jenkins (1993) 
propose three codes of accountability: financial, professional, and managerial accountability. 
Combining legal and economic rationalities, the financial code embodies rules of 
authorisation and appropriation; and emphasises the accountability of the accountor for 
probity, the adequacy of internal controls, and for economy and efficiency. The professional 
code draws on the social rationalities that are embodied in the norms and conventions 
associated with a profession and its relationship with its clients, and combines this with what 
is perceived as desirable in terms of regularity (legal rationality) and effectiveness (technical 
rationality). Thus, professional codes emphasise accountability for the appropriateness of a 
service, its accessibility and for matters such as quality, equity and client power. The 
managerial code brings together aspects of legal, economic and technical rationalities. 
However, in contrast to the financial code of accountability, it emphasises the accountor’s 
accountability for organisational integration, for regularity and consistency in service 
provision and for economy and efficiency. The allocation of responsibility for actions, 
decisions, and costs is an inherent feature of this code.  Similar classifications have been 
developed by other researchers (e.g. Sinclair, 1995; Romzek, 2000; Brinkerhoff, 2001; 
Romzek and Johnston, 2005; Bovens, 2005) and inform our understanding of how the scope 
of accountability can be framed. 
 
Within a public sector setting, the role and importance of accountability is emphasised by 
Smith (1971, p.26) who argued that “in the broadest sense, accountability is the central 
objective of democratic government: how can control be exercised over those to whom power 
is delegated?” Internationally, public sector administration was traditionally characterised as 
an activity concerned with administering the legislated functions of government 
 8
organisations, and where key individuals had responsibility for ensuring that the regulations 
and procedures were adhered to and budget expenditure limits not transgressed (Parker and 
Guthrie, 1993). The traditional administration model embodied a hierarchical approach to 
authority-based administration, which was underpinned by the formal model of bureaucratic 
structure and processes originally laid down by Max Weber (Hughes, 1992). Arguably, and in 
this context, the form of accountability was in the nature of a financial code (Gray and 
Jenkins, 1993).  
 
In contrast, the philosophical leaning of the NPM approach to the management of the public 
sector emphasises greater managerial responsibility and a concern for performance. It was 
widely recognised that giving managers adequate and genuine independence of action was 
vital to effective performance (Smith, 1971). The reorientation of the way in which the public 
sector has come to be managed, has expanded the scope of accountability beyond a 
monitoring process that was largely concerned with fiduciary responsibility, stewardship and 
probity, to one of a monitoring process concerned with financial outcomes and the 
achievement of results – performance accountability  (Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Parker and 
Gould, 1999). This is the essence of Gray and Jenkins’ (1993) managerial code of 
accountability. 
 
Significantly, the accountability relationship has extended from the traditional institutional 
arrangement, which concentrated on the responsibility of ministers to parliament and public 
servants to their immediate superior (Parker, 1980), to include a broader group of 
stakeholders (Boyne et al., 2002; Parker and Guthrie, 1993) with different values and interests 
(Mulgan, 2004) and  “calls for openly declared facts and open debate of them by laymen and 
their elected representatives … grounded in a widely held feeling that tax-paying citizens 
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have rights as well as duties” (Normanton, 1971, p.312). Within this broader setting, 
accountability provides a kind of harmony between power and responsibility whereby an open 
and accountable public administration: 
obliges politicians, officials and managements to engage openly in dialogue which 
calls into question what they are doing, and sometimes the assumptions upon which 
that activity is founded…. This is not merely a matter of exposure to criticism; 
administration may indeed be good and merit no criticism, but it should also be 
publicly seen to be good. (Normanton, 1971, p.320). 
 
Arguably, such accountability draws on aspects of all five rationalities – legal, economic, 
technical, social and political – and in this context a code of public accountability is seen to 
exist (Sinclair, 1995). Public accountability refers to a public entitlement to be informed about 
the performance and condition of the entity under the accountor’s responsibility, and as such 
requires “the reporting of comprehensive information about the condition, performance, 
activities and progress to all those with social, economic and political interests” (Coy and 
Dixon, 2004, p.81). Within this realm of public accountability, the accountability 
relationships of public sector institutions are seen to be multi-directional which Bovens 
(2005) refers to as vertical, horizontal and diagonal accountability.  
 
Commonly associated with the Westminster system of government, vertical (or hierarchical) 
accountability has been the dominant form of public sector accountability and is underpinned 
by a series of principal-agent relationships whereby the public sector institution is 
organisationally accountable to a political superior in accordance with an established ‘chain of 
command’ culminating in ministerial responsibility to Parliament. Diagonal accountability 
relationships are seen to exist between the accountor institution and, predominately, agents of 
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Parliament and/or government (for example, auditors and ombudsmen). These agents are 
established or engaged by Parliament and/or government to monitor, control and report on the 
conduct of accountor institutions and as such are regarded as “auxiliary forms of 
accountability that were instituted to help the political principals” (Bovens, 2005, p.196). 
Such agents may not have formal powers of holding accountors to account but act as 
intermediaries in the accountability process. Horizontal accountability involves public sector 
institutions in a more diversified set of informal accountability relationships where the 
accountee does not have formalised power to enforce compliance. 
 
At the core of an accountability relationship, whether the relationship be vertical, diagonal or 
horizontal, is the ability of the accountee to assess and improve the quality of performance 
and to have the power to evaluate and hold to account the person who gives the account 
(Stewart, 1984). In this regard, Stewart (1984) distinguishes between two forms of 
accountability relationship, the ‘bond of accountability’ and the ‘link of accountability’, and 
argues that the ‘bond of accountability’ recognises the responsibility one party has to another 
whereas the ‘link of accountability’ only recognises a mutual expectation of responsiveness 
(Ryan, Dunstan and Brown, 2001). It is the bond of accountability, demonstrating at a 
minimum the capacity for power, which underpins the ‘true’ essence of accountability. 
Although not of the same order as a bond of accountability, a link of accountability has an 
important role to play in supporting accountability and can, in itself, induce change and 
improvement. As argued by Jones (1977, p.5), and within a public sector context: 
Connections of control and responsibility are different from linkages of 
responsiveness; officials and civil servants, ministers and MPs may be responsive to a 
variety of forces in society – trade unions, employees, consumers, pressure groups of 
various kinds, but they are not responsible to them. A prudent concern for the views of 
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such groups, arising out of an appreciation of their political influence, leads those 
holding responsible positions in government to pay them attention. But this 
relationship does not involve responsibility. Responsibility certainly entails 
responsiveness, but responsiveness does not entail responsibility. 
 
The recognition of these rationalities and that codes of accountability differ in what they bring 
within the gaze of accountability, provides a framework for examining stakeholder views on 
the accountability of Malaysian local authorities. The framework directs attention to the need 
to consider the scope of accountability, the various actors in the accountability process and 
the relationship between them. The nature of the relationship between the accountor and 
accountee can be expected to affect the information demanded or given and, therefore, 
accountability for different things may lead to preferences for different types of information 
processed in the account (Patton, 1992).  Accountability objectives imply that local authorities 
should be accountable to those with whom there is either a link or a bond of accountability. 
Their role imposes responsibilities in respect of the resources under their control creating a 
bond of accountability with certain stakeholders. In addition there is a need to respond to the 
information requirements of other stakeholders who lack the ability to hold them directly to 
account. 
 
Degeling et al. (1996) suggest that what should be brought into focus by an accountability 
system is determined by what functionally is required for establishing and maintaining 
different types of accountability relationships. This paper uses the framework of 
accountability as a platform to explore internal and external stakeholders’ understanding of 
their relationship with Malaysian local authorities. 
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3.0 Administrative and Accountability Structures within the Malaysian Local 
Authority Sector  
Malaysia is a federation of thirteen states and three federal territories. As a former British 
colony the federal parliament has been modelled on the British Westminster system and 
consists of the King (Yang Di Pertuan Agung), the Lower House or House of Representatives 
(Dewan Rakyat) and the Upper House or Senate (Dewan Negara). Members of the Lower 
House are elected whereas members of the Upper House are appointed. Under the terms of 
the Federal Constitution, executive power is vested in the hands of the King; however, in all 
practicality day-to-day government is exercised by a Cabinet of Ministers led by the Prime 
Minister. The Cabinet is collectively responsible to parliament. 
 
At the state level, each state has a ‘unicameral legislature’ (UNESCAP, 1999) – the State 
Legislative Assembly (Dewan Undangan Negeri), with the state ruler (Sultan) or governor 
(for states where there is no hereditary ruler) as the supreme head (EIU, 2006). The members 
of the State Legislative Assembly are elected representatives. The State Executive 
Committee, chaired by the Chief Minister, exercises the day-to-day affairs of state 
government and is collectively responsible to the State Legislative Assembly. The 
administrative machinery of state government consists of state departments, statutory bodies, 
public corporations, and local authorities (city halls, municipal and district councils). 
 
The constitutional division of legislative power between federal and state governments is set 
out in the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution and summarised in Table 1. Of 
particular relevance to this study, the Constitution stipulates that local authorities fall under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of state governments.  
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Table 1: Division of Power between Federal and State Governments 
Federal Responsibilities State Responsibilities Shared Responsibilities 
External affairs 
Defense and security 
Trade, commerce and 
industry 
Shipping, communication 
and transport 
Water supply, rivers and 
canals 
Finance and taxation 
Education and health 
Labour and social security 
Public works and utilities 
Muslim religious law 
Land ownership and use 
Agriculture and forestry 
State works and water supply 
(when not federalised) 
Loans for state development 
and public debt 
Malay reservation and 
custom 
Local Authorities1 
Social welfare 
Public health 
Town and country planning 
Drainage and irrigation 
Rehabilitation of mining land 
and soil erosion 
National parks and wildlife 
Source: Phang (2008, p.2) 
 
By the early 1970s there were a large number of local authorities (418) in Malaysia many of 
which were relatively small, non-autonomous and non-viable (UNESCAP, 1999). The 
enactment of the Local Government Act 1976 (widely known in Malaysia as Act 171) 
culminated in the reform and restructuring of the administration of local authorities with a 
notable outcome of consolidating local authorities into three main categories according to 
population and annual revenue - city council/city hall, municipal council, and district 
council2. Currently, there are 145 local authorities in Malaysia comprising 12 city 
councils/city halls, 37 municipal councils, and 96 district councils.  
 
Local authorities operate as semi-autonomous entities within the state government framework 
and perform two key roles – the provision of basic services and the regulation of land use and 
                                                 
1 Although the term ‘local government’ is used in the Federal Constitution, the terms ‘local government’ and 
‘local authority’ are often used interchangeably in Malaysia. Othman (2001) suggests that the term ‘local 
government’ is no longer appropriate, instead the term ‘local authority’ is seen to be more suitable given the fact 
that local authorities are similar to the State government departments. 
2 To be categorised as a city council/hall the population should be more than 500,000 with annual income in 
excess of MYR 100 million. For the municipal council, the population should be more than 150,000 and annual 
income of more than MYR 20. For smaller authorities (district councils), the population is less than 150,000 with 
annual income less than MYR 20 million (as per approval in the meeting of the National Council for Local 
Government on 3rd June 2008. www.kpkt.gov.my. Retrieved on 09.10.08) 
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business activity (Abdullah, 2006). Basic services include mandatory responsibility for waste 
collection, provision of street lighting, public health-related activities, public amenities (e.g. 
veterinary services and transport), maintenance of recreational parks and the provision of 
social services (e.g. child care centres). Additional roles such as facilitating business activities 
and industrial development are at the discretion of the local authority (UNESCAP, 1999). The 
adoption of a NPM philosophy within the broader Malaysian public sector has seen local 
authorities contract out service delivery to private sector entities (e.g. solid waste disposal and 
sewerage services) (Singaravello et al., 2006).  
 
Local authorities are the dominant state government administrative machinery and, although 
early forms of local authorities tended to be modelled on British institutions (Norris, 1978), 
local authorities have evolved into “a system having its own identity, characteristics and laws 
that reflect socio-economic and political environment of the country” (UNESCAP, 1999, p.8). 
Nevertheless, local authorities are expected to operate on the principle of ultra-vires, that is, 
they can only undertake activities as specified in statute and in accordance with by-laws.  
 
The governance structure of local authorities consists of a mayor (president) and a council. 
Prior to 1965, the mayor and members of council were elected by local residents. However, as 
a result of internal administrative and political problems such as unequal ethnic balance in 
urban areas (Signaravello et al., 2006) and confrontation with Indonesia over the newly 
formed Malaysian federation (UNESCAP, 1999), the electoral system for local authorities 
was replaced by a “bureaucratic dominant type of local government” (Cheema and Hussein, 
1978, p.580). Under the resulting nominative representation system the State Government 
appoints both mayor (president) and members of council (Phang, 2008).  
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As shown in Figure 1, the state government exercises its control over local authorities through 
the State Committee for Local Government. The powers of the state government include 
approval of local authorities’ budgets, appointment and removal of mayor and/or members of 
council, power to withhold confirmation of by-laws and the imposition of rates (Cheema and 
Hussein, 1978).  
 
Figure 1: The Relationship between Local Authorities and the Federal and State 
Governments  
 
          Federal 
 Ministry of Housing and      Government  
            Local Government                               
    
      National Council For 
      Local Government  
                                                                                   *                                                                             
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
    State Committee for Local   State  
    Government     Government  
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
          Local   
City/Municipal/District Councils   Authority            
 
 :  lines of advice, communication and inspection 
               : lines of authority. * denotes authority only for approved policy  
 
Source: Cheema and Hussein, 1978, p.584, Othman, 2001, p.175. 
 
Dealings between the local authority and Federal government are handled by the federal 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government. The Ministry provides advice to local authorities 
in matters especially related to legal and major policy issues (Article 5A, Federal 
Constitution). The Federal Constitution (Article 95A) provides for the National Council for 
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Local Government to act as a forum for Federal, State and local authorities to co-ordinate 
policies and laws relating to local authority administration. Although the National Council is a 
conduit for the transfer of Federal funds to local authorities, neither it nor other federal 
agencies have influence over the financial affairs of the local authority (Faruqi, 2001). 
 
Sources of income and finance for all local authorities (as classified by the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government) include assessment taxes and rates, licences and permits, 
rentals, grants from Federal and State governments, car parking charges, planning fees, fines, 
interest and loans (Singaravello, 2006). Assessment taxes and rates are the predominant 
source of income and make up approximately 60% of total income for city and municipal 
councils with grants from federal and state governments averaging approximately 15% of 
total income (Phang and Subramaniam, 2006; Setapa and Yee, 2003). Notably, district 
councils received approximately 29% of their income in the form of assessment taxes and 
grants amount to approximately 53% of income (Singaravello and Subramaniam, 2006). 
Local authorities are able to apply to federal government and financial institutions for loans; 
however approval must first be obtained from the state government. 
 
The accountability structure between local authorities and state government is both direct and 
formal. The Local Government Act 1976 (Section 9) empowers the state government to issue 
directions of a general nature to a local authority, through the mayor (president), on the 
policies to be followed in the exercise of powers conferred and the duties imposed under the 
Local Government Act 1976, and other specific tasks and responsibilities as mandated by the 
state government. The state government provides grants to local authorities and authorises the 
imposition of assessment taxes and rates and other charges to be collected by local authorities. 
Bound by directives issued by state government and entrusted with resources transferred 
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and/or authorised by state government the formal accountability is complete with the 
requirement for local authorities to furnish to state government a statement of account in 
regard to their properties and activities (Faruqi, 2001).  
 
Although there is little opportunity for the public (both as tax/ratepayer and consumer) to hold 
key office holders to account by way of, for example, direct sanctions (e.g. via election), there 
are a number of provisions that allow the public to gain access to information regarding the 
performance of local authorities and to provide feedback. For example, section 23 of Act 171 
requires that meetings of local authorities be open to the public and representatives of local 
media, section 27 of the Act provides for the minutes of the proceedings of the local authority 
to be available for inspection by any tax/rate payer, and section 60(4) of Act 171 requires that 
audited financial accounts to be published in the government gazette. In addition, section 142 
of Act 171 provides that “citizens who are dissatisfied with the authorities’ performance have 
a right to make objections in writing and are allowed an opportunity of being heard at the 
consequent enquiry”. There are a number of avenues currently available to the public to 
submit their objections. They can make a direct submission to the local authority concerned, 
to the Public Complaint Bureau of the Prime Minister’s Department, or they can make public 
objections/complaints via the media. The Bureau may then review the case and if necessary 
bring its findings to the attention of the relevant state government to take further action. 
Within this regime, the broader public have no opportunity to hold local authorities to 
account; rather, any sanctions are imposed through a higher authority such as the state 
government. 
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Within an administrative background incorporating defined accountability structures and 
reporting lines for local authorities we seek to understand stakeholders’ views of 
accountability relationships and scope. 
 
4.0 Method 
Relevant data was obtained by means of an anonymous questionnaire survey designed to 
gather insights into three core questions that underpin the study: (1) should a local authority 
be accountable for its performance and if so, why; (2) what do key stakeholders understand by 
the term ‘accountability’; and (3) who is a local authority accountable to? The questions 
required respondents to either tick or circle an appropriate prompt that summarised the 
respondent’s views, and/or provide a short statement. 
 
A total of 1,738 questionnaires were distributed to a broad range of internal and external 
stakeholders (Hyndman & Anderson, 1995). For the purposes of the current study, internal 
stakeholders include local authority councillors, management and employees (Lapsley, 1992; 
Boyne et al., 2002), and external stakeholders include members of the public, representatives 
of state governments and creditors of local authorities (Rutherford, 1992, 2000; Stecollini, 
2004). For public stakeholders, the questionnaires were personally distributed to people who 
lived or worked in the locality of each local authority and showed interest3 and willingness to 
participate in the survey. Participants were randomly selected from customers at the local 
authorities’ counters, people who resided within the locality of the local authority concerned 
(identified with the assistance of the community leaders), people who used facilities provided 
by the local authorities (such as public libraries, bus/taxi stations and recreation centres) and 
                                                 
3 Studies that include only interested subjects in their work include Jones et al., 1985; Daniels and Daniels, 1991; 
Dixon et al., 1994. 
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people who were renting premises owned by the authorities (i.e. owners of businesses run in 
the shops/stalls provided by the authorities). 
 
The director or officer of the Community Affairs or Public Relations Department for 38 local 
authorities assumed the self appointed role of ‘gatekeeper’ and, as such, was tasked with 
responsibility for the distribution of the questionnaire to councillors, management, employees 
and creditors, collection of questionnaires and issuing of follow-up reminder notices. On the 
advice of each director/officer 20 to 40 questionnaires were provided for distribution with 
mutual agreement that the distribution should include representation from each group of 
potential respondents. Questionnaires were directly sent to the accountants of eight state 
governments to whom the local authorities report. 
 
A total of 722 questionnaires were returned, however, the analysis is based on 666 responses 
that were considered to be sufficiently complete (see Table 1). This constitutes an overall 
response rate of 38%4 and is considered acceptable for this type of instrument5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 We provide further comment on the response rate and other issues of potential bias at the end of the paper. 
5 Response rates of less than 25% are common in accounting research (Smith, 2003). 
 20
Table 1: Response Summary 
 Number of 
Questionnaires 
Distributed 
Number of  Useable 
Responses 
Response Rate 
Internal Stakeholders 
• Councillors 
• Management 
• Employees 
 
Total Internal 
 
External Stakeholders 
• Public 
• State Government 
• Creditors 
 
Total External 
 
TOTAL 
 
229 
286 
490 
_____ 
1005 
_____ 
 
620 
8 
105 
______ 
733 
______ 
1738 
===== 
 
13 
92 
144 
_____ 
249 
______ 
 
399 
6 
12 
______ 
417 
______ 
666 
==== 
 
5.7% 
32.2% 
29.4% 
______ 
24.7% 
______ 
 
64.4% 
75% 
11.4% 
______ 
56.8% 
______ 
38.3% 
===== 
 
 
5.0 Findings 
5.1 Accountability of Local Authorities for Performance 
All respondents thought that a local authority should be accountable for its performance, 
however, when asked to provide a reason for local authorities to be held accountable, a variety 
of reasons were forthcoming. As summarised in Table 2 each respondent’s reason has been 
coded into eleven themes, which in turn have been categorised into general classifications6 
reflecting an underlying concern of accountability. The most common reason (28% of all 
respondents) for such accountability is a perceived need for local authorities to demonstrate 
how they have spent the funds provided by tax and rate payers. All stakeholder groups held 
similar views of the responsibility of local authorities for tax and rate payer monies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 It is acknowledged that some caution needs to be taken when interpreting these general classifications given the 
subjective opinions of the researchers in the classification process. 
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Table 2: Reasons for Local Authorities to be held Accountable 
Stakeholders7 
External Internal All 
 
Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Customer: 
• Raise level of customer satisfaction 
• To increase customer confidence and trust 
• To ensure quality services are provided 
• To improve the quality of services 
provided 
 
Tax/Ratepayer: 
• Responsibility for tax/ratepayer monies 
 
Public: 
• To improve public image and support 
• To demonstrate public benefit 
 
Organisational: 
• To improve managerial performance 
• To improve financial control 
 
Government: 
• In return for delegated 
        powers/responsibilities 
• Obligation as a government agency 
 
No reason stated 
 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
63 
51 
33 
7 
 
 
 
112 
 
 
70 
7 
 
 
57 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
0 
 
12 
____ 
417 
====
 
15 
12 
8 
2 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
16 
2 
 
 
14 
0 
 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
3 
____ 
100% 
==== 
 
20 
16 
24 
3 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
34 
9 
 
 
41 
20 
 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
3 
____ 
249 
====
 
8 
6 
10 
1 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
14 
3 
 
 
17 
8 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
____ 
100% 
==== 
 
83 
67 
57 
10 
 
 
 
187 
 
 
104 
16 
 
 
98 
22 
 
 
 
5 
 
2 
 
15 
____ 
666 
==== 
 
12 
10 
9 
2 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
16 
2 
 
 
15 
3 
 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
2 
____ 
100% 
==== 
 
 
Accountability, as a means of improving the public image of local authorities (16%), is the 
second most subscribed view closely followed by the view that accountability leads to an 
improvement in managerial performance (15%). However, when the respondents are divided 
into their respective external/internal constituencies, a difference in viewpoint emerges. 
Sixteen percent of external stakeholders are of the view that accountability provides a means 
of improving public image. A further 15% are of the view that holding local authorities 
accountable may ultimately raise the level of customer satisfaction and increase customer 
                                                 
7 The response rate for two groups of stakeholders (refer Table 1) is low therefore we have not reported the 
results by stakeholder type, but have instead grouped them as external and internal stakeholders. We have 
included an analysis by stakeholder type in Appendices 1-4. For Table 2 refer to Appendix 1. 
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confidence and trust (12%).  Arguably, the two views are linked. If customers are seen to be 
satisfied with the quality and quantity of local authority services, then the wider public are 
equally supportive of the local authority and its endeavours. Interestingly, accountability as a 
means of increasing customer satisfaction, confidence and trust is not as strongly identified by 
internal stakeholders. For internal stakeholders 17% of respondents subscribed to the view 
that accountability leads to an improvement in managerial performance while a further 14% 
suggest that accountability is a means of improving the public image of local authorities. It 
could be argued that these two views are also linked whereby, for example, if local authorities 
are seen to go about their business in a managerially responsible manner, then the wider 
public will remain supportive. The least commonly held view across all respondents and 
stakeholder groups is that the accountability of a local authority is warranted on the basis of 
its statutory relationship to its governing body (State Government). 
 
5.2 Scope of Accountability 
Respondents were asked to identify from a list, the phrase or phrases that explained their 
understanding of accountability: 
(a) Accountable for expenditure made in accordance with rules and regulations; 
(b) Accountable for the use of financial resources; 
(c) Accountable for the provision of efficient and effective services; 
(d) Accountable for the management of entrusted public monies and organisational 
accomplishments. 
 
These phrases are based on Kearns (1996), Munro (1996) and Mulgan (2000) who support the 
view that accountability is not only concerned with reporting on one’s actions and activities, 
but also extends to being responsive to the expectations of an array of individuals and 
institutions.  Although presented in a discrete format each phrase is intended to represent a 
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difference in the scope of accountability with an implicit hierarchy between the phrases. 
Although we are unable to determine if respondents recognised an implicit hierarchy, the 
opportunity for respondents to select multiple phrases does provide us with some insights. 
Table 3 summarises the respondent’s identification of phrases that canvassed the scope of 
accountability.  
 
Table 3: Patterns on the Scope of Accountability 
 Stakeholders8 
External Internal All  
Freq % 
n = 384 
Freq % 
n = 227 
Freq % 
n = 6119 
Indicated (a) only 
Indicated (b) only 
Indicated (c) only 
Indicated (d) only 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
Indicated (a) only 
Indicated (a) and (b), or (b); but 
not (c) or (d) 
Indicated (a) and/or (b) and (c), 
or (c); but not (d) 
Indicated (a) and/or (b) and/or 
(c), and (d), or (d) 
 
TOTAL 
15 
72 
49 
13 
______ 
149 
===== 
 
15 
88 
 
98 
 
183 
 
______ 
384 
===== 
4 
19 
13 
3 
______ 
39% 
===== 
 
4 
23 
 
25 
 
48 
 
______ 
100% 
===== 
15 
13 
36 
0 
______ 
64 
===== 
 
15 
15 
 
64 
 
133 
 
______ 
227 
===== 
6 
6 
16 
0 
_______ 
28% 
====== 
 
6 
7 
 
28 
 
59 
 
_______ 
100% 
====== 
30 
85 
85 
13 
______ 
213 
===== 
 
30 
103 
 
162 
 
316 
 
______ 
611 
===== 
5 
14 
14 
2 
_______ 
35% 
====== 
 
5 
17 
 
26 
 
52 
 
_______ 
100% 
====== 
 
A small minority of respondents (5%) suggest that the scope of accountability should be 
limited to issues of probity and legality (phrase (a) - rules and regulations) which emphasises 
the compliance reporting of fiduciary accountability (Kluvers, 2003). Phrase (b) indicates a 
concern for compliance and process (Stewart, 1984) with an emphasis on ‘input controls, 
control of expenditure in terms of appropriations and ensuring the money was spent without 
fraud’ (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992). Seventeen percent of the total survey respondents 
                                                 
8 Appendix 2 provides an analysis by stakeholder type. 
9 Although 666 returned questionnaires were considered ‘usable’ (refer Table 1), 55 of these respondents did not 
indicate a response for this particular question. 
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consider that to be held accountable only requires the rendering of an account of the use of 
financial resources. Notably, a greater proportion of external stakeholders (23%) subscribed 
to this view compared to internal stakeholders (7%) suggesting that for a majority of internal 
stakeholders accountability is more than just compliance with rules and regulations and 
reporting on the use of financial resources; accountability is of a higher order. Both phrases 
(a) and (b) reflect the traditional notion of accountability.  However, this traditional view is no 
longer sufficient in an era of NPM and therefore accountability should also represent “the 
efficient use of resources and the effectiveness of policy decisions” (Kluvers 2003, p.58) - 
programme and performance accountability (Stewart, 1984). At this level the scope of 
accountability extends beyond the economic. A majority of respondents indicated that the 
scope of accountability should extend beyond the financial code of accountability and 
encompass elements promoted by the NPM. Twenty six percent of respondents indicated a 
concern for the performance of the organisation in the efficient and effective delivery of 
outputs and, importantly, a further 52% identified an expectation that the scope of 
accountability should encapsulate a broader concern over organisational performance and the 
use of entrusted funds. More internal stakeholders (59%) compared to external stakeholders 
(48%) suggested that local authorities should be held accountable for all aspects of their 
business. Arguably this indicates a greater awareness by internal stakeholders of 
contemporary expectations in the role and management of local authorities. 
 
5.3 Accountability Relationship 
Respondents were asked to consider the accountability relationships of Malaysian local 
authorities.  As can be seen from Table 4 an overwhelming majority of respondents identified 
‘rendering an account to all stakeholders’ and only 8% identified ‘rendering an account to the 
higher authority only’. This finding, which is consistent among all stakeholder groups, 
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indicates a broad view of the directional nature of the accountability relationship between 
local authorities and stakeholders. A more detailed analysis is given in Table 5 which 
summarises the responses of respondents to the list of possible accountability relationships. 
Respondents were able to identify more than one accountability relationship.  
 
Table 4: Direction of Accountability 
Stakeholders10 
External Internal All 
 
 
Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Rendering an account to the higher  
   authority only 
Rendering an account to all  
   stakeholders 
 
TOTAL 
33 
 
304 
 
______ 
337 
===== 
10 
 
90 
 
______ 
100% 
===== 
7 
 
137 
 
______ 
144 
===== 
5 
 
95 
 
______ 
100% 
===== 
40 
 
441 
 
_______ 
48111 
====== 
8 
 
92 
 
______ 
100% 
===== 
 
Table 5: Accountability Relationship  
Stakeholders12 
External Internal All 
 
Freq % 
n = 417 
Freq % 
n = 249 
Freq % 
n = 666 
Public as tax payers 
Public as service consumers 
State Government 
Federal Government 
Councillors 
Employees 
Creditors (suppliers/lenders) 
Auditors 
386 
381 
287 
202 
119 
112 
43 
37 
93 
91 
69 
48 
29 
27 
10 
9 
205 
196 
183 
151 
118 
120 
87 
74 
82 
79 
73 
61 
47 
48 
35 
30 
591 
577 
470 
353 
237 
232 
130 
111 
89 
87 
71 
53 
36 
35 
20 
17 
 
As shown in Table 5, over 90% of the external respondents agreed that a local authority 
should be accountable for its performance to the public whether the public be considered as a 
source of funds (tax/ratepayers) or as recipient/consumer of local authority provided services. 
                                                 
10 An analysis by stakeholder type is provided in Appendix 3. 
11 185 respondents provided no response to either of these two statements. 
12 An analysis by stakeholder type is provided in Appendix 4. 
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Although internal respondents most frequently identified an accountability relationship 
between local authorities and the public (approximately 80% of internal respondents) the 
identification of this relationship was not as strong as for external respondents. Nevertheless, 
this overall finding is consistent with the reasons cited as to why a local authority should be 
accountable and which predominately centred on customer, tax/ratepayer, and public (refer 
Table 2).  
 
A majority of respondents (71%) are of the opinion that State Government, and to a lesser 
extent the Federal Government (53%), are also important parties that a local authority should 
be accountable to. It is notable that while external and internal stakeholders held similar 
strong views on an accountability relationship between a local authority and state 
government, the external stakeholders are less certain about an accountability relationship 
with the Federal Government (less than 50% of external respondents). While the recognition 
of a strong line of accountability between local authorities and State Government is consistent 
with the traditional hierarchical relationship between State Governments and local authority13, 
as observed from Table 2 this is the least cited reason for the accountability of local 
authorities.  
 
Respondents also identify other accountability relationships whereby, and arising in the 
context of the NPM, ‘accountability to whom’ has been widened to include accountability to a 
broader group of stakeholders with different values and interest (Parker and Guthrie, 1993; 
Mulgan, 2004).  
 
6.0 Analysis of Findings and Discussion 
                                                 
13 The Malaysian Federal Constitution stipulates that local authorities are subject to the jurisdiction of their 
respective state government and, therefore, the state government has direct control over local authorities.   
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Essentially accountability is about an obligation in that the person or organisation entrusted 
with responsibility (the accountor) is obliged to explain and justify their conduct to the person 
or organisation who assigned the responsibility (the accountee). Accountability implies that 
the accountee has the right to ask for explanations. Such rights are the essence of 
accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2001). We find that the Malaysian stakeholders of local 
authorities consider that accountability involves rendering an account to all stakeholders in 
respect of managerial accountability, financial accountability, and economic efficiency and 
effectiveness. Thus our study identifies most strongly with the relational classification of 
public accountability and codes of financial and managerial accountability. The prominence 
of the public in the array of accountability relationships and their increasing calls for local 
authorities to be called to account, has been observed internationally. For example, Abdul 
Khalid (2006, p.301) observes that the Malaysian public “are more aware of their rights” and 
as such are demanding greater accountability for performance from local authorities.  
 
The broad picture emerging from all respondents is an accountability concern for the local 
authority use of tax and rate payer monies. For external stakeholders, subsequent reasons for 
local authority accountability are predominately concerned with the delivery of customer 
services, whereas for internal stakeholders, other reasons for local authorities to be held 
accountable focus on organisational performance. For the majority of respondents, the call-to-
account is no longer underpinned by past tendencies of a bureaucratic, hierarchical approach 
to public administration and accountability. Instead, and while the concern for financial 
accountability remains high (i.e. responsibility for tax/ratepayer monies and financial control), 
stakeholders identify a strong motivation for the accountability of local authorities on the 
basis of a relationship between the local authorities and their customers/public. The individual 
reasons for this motivation reflect general areas of commonality with aspects of the NPM as 
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encapsulated by the managerial code of accountability, and extended by a public 
accountability whereby the accountability of local authorities is seen to promote greater 
organisational focus on the achievement of output/outcome-related goals (Kluvers, 2003).  
 
It is observed from Table 5, that the identified accountability relationships consist of a range 
of relationships that Stewart (1984) would classify as being in the form of either a ‘bond of 
accountability’ or a ‘link of accountability’. The proposed bonds and links of local authority 
accountabilities are depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Bonds and Links of Accountabilities 
 
 
 
Extending Stewart’s (1984) accountability framework to Malaysian local authorities (and 
drawing on Ryan, Dunstan and Brown, 2002), we tentatively suggest that a bond of 
Public - 
Taxpayers 
Mayor / 
President 
and 
Councillors 
 
 
Local 
Authority Public - 
Consumer Employees 
Auditor 
Federal 
Government 
State Government 
Bond of Accountability 
Link of Accountability 
Creditors 
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accountability exists between the local authority, comprising the president/mayor and 
councillors, and the state government. Such office-holders are nominated14 by the state 
government and arguably are therefore directly accountable to the state government. As 
provided in the Malaysian Local Government Act 1976 (Act 171- section 9), the state 
government has direct control over the affairs of local authorities. In this context, 
accountability becomes part of the vertical (or hierarchical) power relationship between the 
state government and appointed office holder.  
 
We also suggest a bond of accountability may exist between the local authorities and 
creditors; specifically when evidenced by a contractual agreement that sets out the 
responsibility of one party to another in respect of resources supplied/consumed. Similarly, 
and in accordance with the doctrines of the NPM, contracts relating to conditions of 
employment create responsibilities and expectations for both employer and employee which, 
in our view, would also give rise to a bond of accountability. 
 
Respondents identified an accountability relationship between a local authority and its 
auditor. Although an auditor does not have power of sanctions over the conduct of the 
audited, arguably this identified relationship may reflect a respondent view of the 
‘responsiveness’ of local authorities to any concerns raised by the auditor. If so, then 
tentatively a link of diagonal accountability may be seen to exist recognising the intermediary 
role that the auditor plays between the local authority and Federal and State government. 
 
We suggest that in the absence of the capacity for power, the accountability relationship 
between local authority and the broader public is therefore only in the form of a link of 
                                                 
14 Malaysia has a nominative representation system that operates at the local authority level. That is, the 
mayor/president and council members are not elected officials but are appointed by the respective State 
Governments. 
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accountability, which recognises an informal “recognition of responsiveness” by local 
authorities (Stewart, 1984, p.25). However, as indicated in Table 1 respondents to the 
questionnaire clearly indicate that they perceive that local authorities should be held 
accountable because the local authority has a responsibility to provide services which are 
funded by tax/ratepayers and a responsibility to provide information on how that money has 
been spent. It is evident that while vertical accountability underpins the formalised 
accountability system, there is a strong undercurrent for greater institutionalized practices of 
openness between a local authority and its citizenship. Therefore the relationship with 
tax/ratepayers, although something less than a bond of accountability, is somewhat more than 
a link because of its connection to responsibility requirements. 
 
7.0 Conclusion    
Our findings support the notion that accountability is an elusive concept and difficult to 
define.  Nevertheless, we are able to conclude that stakeholders of Malaysian local authorities 
hold firm views of accountability relationships and scope. Thus we provide some insights that 
may assist in developing understanding of accountability defeating the notion that 
accountability “…reside[s] in a ‘bottomless swamp’ where the more definitive we attempt to 
render the concept, the more murky it becomes” (Sinclair, 1995, p. 221). However there is 
diversity in respect of ‘for what’ and ‘to whom’ accountability should be rendered. It is 
apparent that the need to give an account and the emphasis that has been placed on 
performance by the notion of NPM is recognised by the stakeholders. This shows that the 
performance of local authorities is of increased interest, significance and value to the 
stakeholders and implies that Malaysian local authorities need to reflect a results-oriented 
environment in order to meet their stakeholders’ expectations. Overall accountability was 
 31
recognised as an essential component of power (defined, implied, and delegated) and a 
responsibility imposed by the local authorities’ ability to collect and use public money.   
 
We suggest that a more formal accountability relationship between local authority and tax/rate 
payers and the public as a whole is needed. Besides maintaining the statutory provision 
currently available to preserve public rights to information from local authorities, other 
measures need to be adopted for a more formal accountability relationship. An accountability 
relationship occurs because the authorities accept the transfer of a large portion of financial 
resources in terms of assessment taxes and rates from the public (Laughlin, 1990).  Therefore, 
the local authorities are obliged to present an account of, and to answer for their performance 
to the tax/ratepayers, regardless of whether there are bonds of accountability or links of 
accountability (Gray and Jenkins, 1993).  
 
To date accountability relationships have been limited to those between the authority and state 
government. Although a number of statutory requirements/authorities are supportive of the 
public rights to information in relation to Malaysian local authorities, we suggest that the 
research results indicate that a more formal accountability relationship is desired.  
Respondents’ comments on the accountability of local authorities indicate a lack of 
confidence and respect in those organisations and more formal lines of accountability would 
enhance their credibility and arguably, contribute to an improvement in the performance 
management of the Malaysian public sector. Thus, and in respect of NPM, local authorities 
would account for economy, efficiency, appropriateness and accessibility of service provision 
and adequacy of internal controls. Then administration would be “…publicly seen to be good” 
(Normanton, 1971, p.320). 
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Limitations and further research 
The major limitation of this study is that the scope of the research is limited and convenience 
sampling is used, thus limiting the generalisability of the results. The findings and discussion 
are limited to the propositions put forward in the questionnaire and such a survey instrument 
provides limited opportunity to solicit further meanings to participant’s responses. The self-
selection of individuals (i.e. members of the public who showed interest and willingness to 
participate) and the role of the director or officer of the Community Affairs or Public 
Relations Department in distributing questionnaires to other stakeholder groups may represent 
a biased portion of the wider stakeholder population; at least we cannot claim that they are 
representative. However, given that this study is exploratory in nature, the use of self 
selection and interested respondents is considered to be appropriate. Furthermore, several 
researchers (e.g. Jones et al., 1985; Daniels and Daniels, 1991) have included interested 
parties as their study respondents and our study followed this practice. The reported research 
is also subject to response rate bias. Although the overall response rate and the response rate 
for each of the two major classifications (internal stakeholders and external stakeholders) are 
acceptable for this type of instrument (e.g. Smith, 2003), we acknowledge the variability of 
sub-classification response rates and exercise caution in the interpretation of results of 
analysis at this lower level of classification.  
 
While beyond the scope of the study reported in this paper, future research could map out the 
scope of information considered relevant for accountability purposes by stakeholders of 
Malaysian local authorities. In this regard, more direct engagement with identifiable 
stakeholder groupings is desirable and will go some way to address some of the limitations 
identified above. 
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Appendix 1: Reasons for Local Authorities to be held Accountable 
External Internal Focus 
Public 
(n = 399) 
Creditors 
(n = 12) 
State Govt 
(n = 8) 
Councillors 
(n = 13) 
Management 
(n = 92) 
Employees 
(n = 144) 
Customer: 
• Raise level of customer satisfaction 
• To increase customer confidence and trust 
• To ensure quality services are provided 
• To improve the quality of services provided 
Total 
 
Tax/Ratepayer: 
• Responsibility for tax/ratepayer monies 
 
Public: 
• To improve public image and support 
• To demonstrate public benefit 
Total 
 
Organisational: 
• To improve managerial performance 
• To improve financial control 
Total 
 
Government: 
• In return for delegated powers/responsibilities 
• Obligation as a government agency 
Total 
 
No reason stated 
 
TOTAL 
* rounding error 
 
16 
13 
8 
2 
39 
 
 
26 
 
 
17 
1 
18 
 
 
13 
0 
13 
 
 
1 
0 
1 
 
 
3 
-------- 
100% 
 
8 
8 
0 
0 
16 
 
 
25 
 
 
8 
17 
25 
 
 
33 
0 
33 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
--------- 
99%* 
 
0 
0 
17 
0 
17 
 
 
67 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
17 
0 
17 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
---------- 
101%* 
 
8 
0 
8 
8 
24 
 
 
38 
 
 
15 
0 
15 
 
 
8 
0 
8 
 
 
8 
8 
16 
 
 
0 
--------- 
101%* 
 
8 
6 
11 
1 
26 
 
 
29 
 
 
18 
5 
23 
 
 
12 
7 
19 
 
 
0 
1 
1 
 
 
1 
----------- 
99%* 
 
8 
7 
9 
1 
25 
 
 
30 
 
 
10 
3 
13 
 
 
20 
10 
30 
 
 
1 
0 
1 
 
 
1 
--------- 
100% 
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Appendix 2: Patterns on the Scope of Accountability 
External Internal  
Public 
(n = 366) 
Creditors 
(n = 12) 
State Govt 
(n = 6) 
Councillors 
(n = 10) 
Management 
(n = 86) 
Employees 
(n = 131) 
Indicated (a) only 
Indicated (b) only 
Indicated (c) only 
Indicated (d) only 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
Indicated (a) only 
Indicated (a) and (b), or (b); but not (c) or (d) 
Indicated (a) and/or (b) and (c), or (c); but not (d) 
Indicated (a) and/or (b) and/or (c), and (d), or (d) 
 
TOTAL 
4 
19 
13 
4 
_______ 
40% 
======= 
 
4 
24 
27 
45 
_______ 
100% 
======= 
0 
8 
0 
0 
________ 
8% 
======= 
 
0 
8 
0 
92 
______ 
100% 
====== 
0 
0 
0 
0 
_______ 
0% 
======= 
 
0 
0 
0 
100 
_______ 
100% 
======= 
0 
0 
30 
0 
________ 
30% 
======= 
 
0 
0 
40 
60 
________ 
100% 
======= 
8 
7 
9 
0 
________ 
24% 
======= 
 
8 
8 
24 
40 
________ 
100% 
======= 
6 
5 
19 
0 
________ 
30% 
======= 
 
6 
6 
30 
58 
_________ 
100% 
======= 
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Appendix 3: Direction of Accountability 
External Internal  
Public 
(n = 323) 
Creditors 
(n = 8) 
State Govt 
(n = 6) 
Councillors 
(n = 11) 
Management 
(n = 51 
Employees 
(n = 82) 
Rendering an account to the higher authority only 
Rendering an account to all  stakeholders 
 
TOTAL 
10 
90 
---------- 
100% 
====== 
0 
100 
------------ 
100% 
======= 
17 
83 
---------- 
100% 
======= 
9 
91 
__________ 
100% 
======= 
6 
94 
__________ 
100% 
======== 
4 
96 
__________ 
100% 
======== 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Accountability Relationship 
External Internal  
Public 
(n = 399) 
Creditors 
(n = 12) 
State Govt 
(n = 6) 
Councillors 
(n = 13) 
Management 
(n = 92 
Employees 
(n = 144) 
Public as tax payers 
Public as service consumers 
State Government 
Federal Government 
Councillors 
Employees 
Creditors (suppliers/lenders) 
Auditors 
 
98 
92 
68 
48 
28 
26 
10 
8 
58 
58 
92 
58 
17 
25 
8 
8 
100 
83 
100 
83 
83 
67 
67 
83 
92 
85 
92 
77 
54 
46 
54 
31 
79 
73 
75 
67 
47 
48 
30 
30 
83 
82 
71 
55 
47 
49 
36 
29 
 
